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Abstract: The use of pharmacological cognitive enhancers (PCEs) in the healthy 
population is a controversial topic with numerous and expansive repercussions. By 
outlining common proponent arguments on the current PCE state of affairs, the 
definition of normality, and the complex regulation of PCEs, this article addresses 
why the mainstream use of PCEs in the healthy population is still disadvantageous 
overall. In this respect, the influence and roles of researchers to the society are 
emphasized in bringing the focus back to the fundamental issues, which is crucial 
in deciphering its controversy and avoiding costly societal, research credibility and 
ethical implications.
Subjects: Cognitive Neuroscience; Community Health; Health Law and Ethics; Medical 
Ethics
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1. Introduction
Modern human society demands increasingly high-performance levels (e.g. study grades or work 
projects), ideally with the least amount of time necessary. Thus, the ingestion of substances that can 
boost arousal and concentration (i.e. pharmacological cognitive enhancers or PCEs) in healthy indi-
viduals has attracted considerable interest. As these substances (e.g. modafinil and methylpheni-
date) are typically prescribed for treatment purposes (e.g. to increase arousal in patients with sleep 
disorders for modafinil), its use in the healthy and mainstream population is controversial with many 
legal, moral, ethical, and health implications.
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For example, Santoni de Sio, Faulmüller, and Vincent (2014) considers how a PCE-like modafinil 
could impose new obligations on select professions (e.g. surgeons) by implying that taking PCEs 
would minimize risks (e.g. fatigue-related errors) and maximize safety (e.g. successful surgery). 
Moreover, if these enhancements were empirically demonstrated to be effective and safe, a societal 
(possibly even professional) expectation to use them could follow; as, it would be argued that, the 
use of PCEs would be ultimately for the benefit of others (e.g. patient). Santoni de Sio et al.’s (2014) 
example differs slightly to that of a healthy undergraduate taking methylphenidate or Ritalin (a 
stimulant-regulating attention) to enable prolonged study for a test or an athlete taking steroids to 
boost their performance in a sports event, because in these cases the PCE user is seeking to improve 
their prospects and reap the benefits personally rather than taking drugs to improve their perfor-
mance in the service of others. However, this distinction makes little difference, serving to empha-
size again how the repercussions of PCEs extend well beyond medical realms by modifying current 
occupational definitions and societal boundaries.
By questioning common proponent arguments, this paper specifically addresses the concept of 
“acceptable” or “commonplace” use of PCEs in the healthy population, why it still remains disadvan-
tageous fundamentally, and how this entire issue emphasizes our influence and responsibilities as 
researchers to society.
2. Is the status quo acceptable?
Enhancement can be defined as modifying healthy, typically developed systems to perform beyond 
normal limits. It has been suggested that current views of PCEs as unavoidably risky, fraudulent, and 
abnormal could be considered dated; with the further suggestion that PCEs can be likened to mod-
ern innovations (e.g. the internet), natural enhancers (e.g. exercise) and academic aids (e.g. tutoring; 
Greely et al., 2008). Outlining PCE drug mechanisms and ensuring responsible use could possibly 
benefit our modern lifestyle and increased lifespan, besides delaying age-related declines. PCEs may 
even be necessary in selective professions (e.g. in the military to ensure optimal performance; Greely 
et al., 2008), an observation elaborated upon in Santoni de Sio et al. (2014).
However, PCEs cannot be equated to innovations, natural enhancers, and academic aids in this 
respect, as it involves tampering with a normal system, and increasing susceptibility to dependence 
on something synthetic and inessential (Steiner & Van Waes, 2013); it often presents with side ef-
fects like increased heart rate, headache, nausea, and insomnia (Finger, Silva, & Falavigna, 2013) 
besides encouraging an unhealthy mentality and regime. Although there is some similarity to the 
internet in terms of being an “abnormal” lifestyle habit, PCEs need to be consumed on more or less 
a regular basis as effects are dosage-dependent and plateaus with repeated use (Finger et al., 2013; 
Repantis, Schlattmann, Laisney, & Heuser, 2010), resulting in direct, cumulative internal changes 
(Steiner & Van Waes, 2013). While one may argue that natural enhancers (e.g. vitamins or minerals) 
also requires ingestion, it is crucial to realize that natural enhancers are natural substances with 
generally well-known pathways and mechanisms; serve to sustain basic homeostasis and survival; 
have minimal side effects and addictive qualities; with gradual overarching effects that promote 
overall well-being besides performance. The same argument cannot be said for PCEs. It is important 
to realize PCEs like modafinil and methylphenidate were created to restore baselines in a dysregu-
lated system; thus, we cannot expect these effects to translate perfectly to enhance baselines in a 
regulated system without consequence.
Research has shown that advantages offered by PCEs are modest (Husain & Mehta, 2011), not 
straightforward (Lynch, Cox, & Gall, 2014; Urban & Gao, 2014), and merely tips the scale to one’s 
favor (Hyman, 2011). A recent study on medical students using methylphenidate to enhance their 
grades revealed minimal knowledge of its mechanisms and side effects, with no cognitive benefits 
aside from prolonged arousal (Finger et al., 2013). Hence, what is incentive for taking PCEs, particu-
larly when several non-PCEs (e.g. exercise) have proven to be more effective and safe (Dresler et al., 
2013)? What is the message conveyed (particularly to children) if healthy individuals are encouraged 
to take drugs over natural and more effective options, creating an additional lifelong cost and 
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possible addiction? Natural enhancers like exercise, nutrition, and meditation provide means to an 
end, promoting good social habits, favorable consequences with lifelong benefits (Dresler et al., 
2013). But in a world of instant meals and Twitter, who would choose hours of exercise over popping 
a pill, particularly if the latter was encouraged? (Farah et al., 2004) This practice only endorses a 
dysfunctional lifestyle and mentality, bringing more problems to an increasingly aging and ailing 
population.
3. What constitutes “normal”?
PCEs have also been likened to the beneficial use of statins in lowering LDL cholesterol in healthy 
individuals, levels that are not attainable or sustainable by diet or exercise (Hyman, 2011). Perhaps, 
baseline levels should be redefined (Greely et al., 2008; Hyman, 2011) as we consider our predomi-
nantly unnatural lifestyles (e.g. unreasonable working hours) and acceptance/dependence on harm-
less drugs (e.g. caffeine). However, to deal with an already abnormal lifestyle and substance reliance, 
it is counterintuitive that we should modify our criteria to consume even more drugs. If anything, 
this simply creates new diseases in an ordinary population—consider also how thresholds for cho-
lesterol, blood pressure, glucose, and bone density levels are lowered each year, increasing “patient” 
numbers and reliance on drugs (Welch et al., 2011; cf. Sanghavi, 2011). The safety, side effects, and 
interactions of statins are considerable and often not discussed (Ravnskov, Rosch, Sutter, & Houston, 
2006). One also wonders if below-baseline levels of LFL may actually introduce other health prob-
lems, as with abnormally low levels of glucose or fat.
Moreover, if the current regulation of illicit drugs is already a struggle, how would regulating PCEs 
be any less complicated? Despite strict regulations, the use of performance-enhancing drugs in ath-
letes is common, with up to 95% of athletes estimated to have taken them (Morgan, 2006; cf. Cakic, 
2009). If drug regulation is already so problematic in sports (having comparatively less direct contri-
butions to society development in terms of knowledge and technological advancement), one can 
only imagine how much more difficult it would be to regulate PCEs, particularly when users can insist 
it leads to a better life for many (e.g. surgeons, military, and academics). Subsequently, a corre-
sponding problem would inevitably manifest in terms of employment, as one will be forced to con-
template hiring individuals whose capabilities are primarily reliant on PCEs or natural talent. In this 
respect, PCEs simply introduces more problems than solutions.
4. Who decides or regulates control?
It was foreseeable that PCEs would veer into the realm of playing God (Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009)—
by being in a position to enhance a healthy system beyond its natural capacities, one is able to exert 
more influence over one’s own fate or that of someone else. Consider how the trolley problem (for-
mulated by philosophers Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thompson) illustrates this, an analogy in-
spired by Reiner (2011). Two scenarios are presented: a hurtling trolley will kill five captives bounded 
to its tracks, unless a switch is flipped to divert it to another route, killing one person. The second 
scenario is similar, but instead of a switch, one has to push a portly stranger to land between the 
trolley and five captives, saving them but killing him. Philosophers are baffled as to why most people 
feel it is morally acceptable to flip the switch but not push the stranger; given the underlying concept 
of sacrificing one to save five is the same. The key factor rests in that the latter is more emotionally 
salient, requiring more direct, personal contact (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001).
Applying this analogy to the topic of PCEs, the vital question becomes where one is positioned—
the switch, or beside the stranger. Researcher positions are somewhat distant, like building good 
switches, regardless of their utility. By advocating that PCEs be incorporated into mainstream poli-
cies, we strategically place the switch in the tracks. By convincing physicians and the public, we are 
improvising the stranger scenario. Yet, as physicians deal more directly with the public, they are 
more likely to be positioned next to the stranger. In essence, researchers and physicians may have 
the same intentions (flipping the switch and shoving the stranger), but the latter would suffer the 
repercussions, just as Greene et al. (2001) noted with the trolley problem. It is little wonder then that 
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many (not all) physicians tend to err on the side of caution and are still skeptical with PCEs, despite 
established safety claims (Banjo, Nadler, & Reiner, 2010).
What the trolley problem highlights is that researcher roles, influence, and responsibilities have 
strayed well beyond isolated laboratories and domains; and that contemplation of the bigger picture 
and consequences on society has become less optional as we approach controversial areas with far-
reaching implications. It is especially important when its consequences are more directly experienced 
by others (e.g. physicians, society’s gatekeepers in many respects; Farah et al., 2004; Greely et al., 
2008). The scientific community enjoys a privileged status, but this may easily be compromised if 
and when its credibility is lost. This is not to say we all need to become neuroethicists, but rather that 
this perspective be kept in mind in our research endeavors (Urban & Gao, 2014). As Persson and 
Savulescu (2008) insightfully noted, with PCEs, moral development must follow—just as martial arts 
gives one superior combat abilities, its disciples are acutely aware of the accountability of their skills 
and actions.
Taken together, mainstream use of PCEs in the healthy population is certainly not without its mer-
its, but is still outweighed by its graver limitations. In an era already grappling with numerous unre-
solved diseases and rampant drugs, it really seems counterintuitive to fixate on meddling with a 
normal, working system. As researchers, bringing the focus back to the fundamental biological and 
ethical implications of PCEs may just help in deciphering its controversy and context. Presently and 
in the long run, mainstream use of PCEs in the healthy population will do society more harm than 
good.
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